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Writer's pictureChristian B. Wagner

Notes on Implicit Faith, Explicit Faith and Salvation

I recently did a video on this topic responding to the Dimond brothers...many asked for my notes, which I wanted to offer for those who would like to have them in front of them.

Most of this material is taken directly from Francisco Suarez, Cardinal Juan de Lugo, the Salmanticenses, Giles de Coninck (who has one of the fullest treatments of this question), Christian Pesch, and the Sacrae Theologiae Summa along with bits and peices from other authors that I have come across. If any of you know of other good treatments of this question, whether in commentaries on the Summa, theological manuals, journal articles, or monographs, please contact me (comment below or message me through the website). Above all, I most firmly hold this as the position of my master, the Angelic Doctor.

One of the fullest modern treatments of this question comes from Beraza. Unfortunately, it is not scanned, so I do not yet have access to it...but, I know someone with library access who is in the process of scanning the relevant sections for me. I will translate this text for my patrons one of these weeks (which is a reminder that you should become a patron to support this kind of work, join here). I am considering writing a small book or some sort of journal article once I get Beraza since this question is obscure for so many and has become a scandal.

I used to have more notes on the question of St. Thomas' relation to this problem but, unfortunately, I have misplaced them. To remedy this, I will be attaching a brief comment I gave to another who believed that I conceded the Angelic Doctor to the "other side." There is much, much more to be said as to his position on this question, but I hope that the intelligent reader will be able to understand (especially by the distinction between a per se necessity of means and a per accidens necessity of means) that the texts claimed by most who oppose "implicit faith" do not at all disprove the classical positon which I defend.

Besides this, I also have not taken many notes on the post-Vatican II magisterial texts. If anyone has notes, articles, or particular quotes that come to mind, please communicate them to me.

As a final note, I have not really edited these notes...there are possible mistakes whether as to my memory or to spelling/grammar.

I pray that this is help to those who have been severely vexed by this problem.

-Christian B. Wagner, Feast of Pope St. Boniface I

NOTES

Thesis: Explicit, supernatural faith in the narrow sense is necessary by a necessity of means, per se for the articles given in Hebrews, and per accidens for the articles of the Trinity and Incarnation, wherein they can be supplied by implicit faith.

NOTE: By "explicit faith," we are referring to a certain act, NOT the habit of theological faith. Thus, the question is, "When one makes an act of faith, does it, 1. Need to be supernaturally motivated, 2. In response to revelation, 3. Per se to the articles given in Hebrews, 4. Per accidens to the articles of the Trinity and Incarnation?"

< First, some clarity on the meaning of "necessity of means.">

Necessity of Means = The helps without which something cannot be obtained.

  • Absolute Necessity of Means (per se, intrinsically) = Established on the basis of the intrinsic nature of something (e.g., the necessity of sanctifying grace for justification).

    • That God is and rewards those who are just (in the supernatural order)... explicit.

  • Hypothetical Necessity of Means (per accidens, extrinsically) = Established on the basis of the good pleasure of God and can be dispensed (e.g., the necessity of water baptism for salvation or for the sacrament of penance after falling into mortal sin).

    • The Trinity and Incarnation... explicit.

Necessity of Precept = A simple command that obliges all those who hear it, yet has no binding force on those who are invincibly ignorant or otherwise incapacitated.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ABSOLUTE AND HYPOTHETICAL NECESSITY OF MEANS = The former is so necessary that its lack is never supplied... e.g., nobody without sanctifying grace can be saved.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN HYPOTHETICAL NECESSITY OF MEANS AND NECESSITY OF PRECEPT = In terms of a necessity of precept, the lack (i.e., invincible ignorance, physical/moral incapacity, etc.) simply means that the precept does not bind (i.e., something negative), whereas in terms of hypothetical necessity of means, the lack is supplied by extraordinary means (i.e., something positive).

Thus, for example, the vast majority of Catholic theologians teach that water baptism is supplied by baptism of desire and explicit faith in the Trinity and Incarnation is supplied by implicit faith in such. Yet, these are said to be supplied per accidens.

Explicit faith in Incarnation/Trinity --> Implicit faith in Incarnation/Trinity (insofar as one has the act of explicit faith in the fact that God is and rewards those who are just).

Water baptism --> Baptism of Desire.

Sacrament of Penance --> Perfect Contrition.

^All three are necessary by a necessity of means, yet this necessity is per accidens, not per se.

Cf., J. A. de Aldama, La necessidad de medio en la escolastica postridentina: ArchTG 8 (1945) 57-84.

< Faith can either be taken in a broad (manifestation of God as existing through his effects) or narrow (assent to Divine Revelation). This corresponds to the type of revelation that is posited, either revelation in the narrow sense or revelation in the broad sense. Each of these can be distinguished into either natural or supernatural. >

  • Broad natural faith/revelation

  • Broad supernatural faith/revelation

  • Narrow natural faith/revelation

  • Narrow supernatural faith/revelation

Some (e.g., Vega) went so far as to defend natural faith/revelation in the broad sense.

Others (e.g., Ripalda) stated that faith/revelation in the broad sense was necessary, provided that it is supernatural... this position has always had defenders (e.g., Gutberlet in the late 19th century), but it cannot be sustained.

These positions were condemned by Innocent XI:

Faith widely (i.e., broadly) so called according to the testimony of creature or by a similar reason suffices for justification.

There were two controversies on this point:

  1. First, in the 16th century, when Vitoria, Soto, and Vega tried to oppose the idea that faith was necessary by a necessity of means in the absolute sense in a supernatural manner by either teaching that it was only necessary by a necessity of precept OR that a natural manner would suffice. This was opposed by many theologians, especially by Melchor Cano.

  2. Second, in the 17th century, Ripalda, as mentioned, put it forward as a question whether we could hold it as a necessity of means, supernaturally, yet in a broad sense. The theologians (famously, Lugo... which is ironic) rejected this and argued for the narrow reading. It was condemned by Bl. Innocent XI.

So, you have to hold a few things that are established at this point:

  1. This act of faith is necessary by a necessity of means.

  2. This act of faith is something that is supernatural.

  3. This act of faith is something that is in the narrow sense.

  4. The OBJECT that is absolutely necessary for an explicit act of faith is that God is and rewards those who are just.

^ All theologians are unanimous on this point.

YET, the real question arises when we ask what articles are to be believed with this act of faith in the narrow sense.

All theologians agree with St. Paul in Hebrews that we must believe with an explicit faith, on the basis of revelation (i.e., in a narrow sense) that:

  1. God is (as author of the supernatural order), and

  2. Rewards those who are just (with supernatural beatitude).

^ This is with a necessity of means that is ABSOLUTE, i.e., per se.

Thus, Bl. Innocent XI condemns this proposition:

Only faith in one God seems necessary by a necessity of means, not, however, the explicit (faith) in a Rewarder.

NOTICE... many confuse the "that God is and rewards those who are just" for the NATURAL facts of God's existence and providence. This is not the case. RATHER, these are assents to God insofar as He is (the author of the supernatural order) and rewards those (with supernatural beatitude) who are (supernaturally) just.

Here, we see that the description "implicit faith" without qualification is woefully inadequate... faith is necessarily explicit, believing some articles on the basis of some motive (as clarified above, it needs to be on the basis of God supernaturally revealing).

What is "implicit" are those other articles/dogmas/doctrines that are not clearly apprehended. Thus, one may say, for example, that one's faith in the article of the incarnation "implicitly" includes the teaching of Chalcedon. Any "implicit-ness" of faith is taken on the part of the object rather than on the part of the subject (which is ordinarily rejected by the theologians).

From this, we can ask a further question... are there other articles that are necessary, and if they are necessary, with what kind of necessity are they necessary with?

This is asked regarding two articles, the Trinity and Incarnation.

The question is not whether these are necessary with necessity of precept or whether explicit faith is necessary with necessity of means...for, all agree (after the 16th century) that these are necessary with a necessity of means.

Rather, the question is whether they are necessary with a necessity of means per se, intrinsically, and absolutely OR per accidens, extrinsically, and hypothetically.

NOTE: Here, there is a linguistic problem in the tradition... some argue that there is simply a necessity of precept for the articles of the Trinity and Incarnation. Others hold that explicit faith is necessary with a necessity of means per se, but per accidens implicit faith suffices (e.g., Salmanticenses, Suarez, Pesch, STS, and many others). This seems more of a linguistic problem within the tradition than a substantive one, as both sides agree that implicit faith in such mysteries is necessary in the absence of explicit faith...the very necessity of supplying indicates a belief in a necessity of means per accidens rather than a simple necessity of precept (which would need to supplying).

There are two important magisterial documents on this point.

  1. The teaching of the Holy Office in 1703, which stated:

Resp. A promise is not sufficient, but a missionary is bound to explain to an adult, even a dying one who is not entirely incapacitated, the mysteries of faith which are necessary by a necessity of means, as are especially the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.
A missionary should not baptize one who does not believe explicitly in the Lord Jesus Christ, but is bound to instruct him about all those matters which are necessary, by a necessity of means, in accordance with the capacity of the one to be baptized.

As we stated above, there is a two-fold sense in which "necessity of means" is taken, which should easily make this conformable with the traditional teaching.

  1. The teaching of Benedict XIV:

A confessor sins by absolving someone who is ignorant of the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, except in cases of urgent necessity, and exposes the sacrament to the danger of invalidity. (Const. Etsi minime, t. i. Bull. pag. 110.)
The Bishop must ensure that the Priest who hears Confessions holds as certain and immutable that sacramental absolution cannot be validly imparted to someone who does not know what is necessary by means of necessity... (ibid.)

< Here, Benedict XIV clearly views the teaching on the mysteries of the Trinity to be, somehow, not necessary by a necessity of means per se, as it is impossible to imagine that he could command a priest to give an invalid absolution to someone in danger of death. >

^This type of argument is represented in the traditional "catechumen argument," which basically runs like this...you have a catechumen who is being introduced to the faith. He hasn't gotten his catechesis on the Trinity yet. If he is martyred, is he saved?

In the mind of Benedict XIV (and some argue also in the wording of the 1703 statement), sacraments that are necessary with a necessity of means (baptism, penance) CAN be given in danger of death to those who, due to some incapacity, whether moral or physcial, cannot have those things that are necessary with a necessity of means per accidens. This is all CLEARLY resolved with the distinctions we have made, but are completely muddied by the view that such explicit knowledge is necessary with a necessity of means per se.

These two positions can be harmonized with the classical distinction given between the two types of necessity of means.

There are several arguments supporting the fact that these two articles are necessary by a necessity of means per se and not per accidens:

  1. It is evident from the teaching that explicit faith in the Trinity and Incarnation was not necessary before the incarnation. If it were intrinsically necessary (per se, absolute necessity of means), it would not have been subject to change with the gospel's promulgation.

  2. It is clear from the contingent nature of the Incarnation. God could have refrained from becoming incarnate if He had so willed (as all the Fathers teach). Yet, it is unthinkable that this would have rendered justification impossible.

  3. It is evident from the fact that the revelation of the Trinity might have been omitted, leaving only the teaching on the Incarnation. This further illustrates its extrinsic (per accidens) nature.

  4. It is evident from the intrinsic sufficiency of God as the author of the supernatural order and the rewarder of supernatural beatitude. These truths are intrinsically connected with supernatural faith and are therefore necessary with an absolute necessity of means.

< Yet, a seeming contradiction arises: >

On the one hand, we deny that a broad understanding of revelation (i.e., through creatures alone) suffices for a salvific act of faith, even if it is supernatural. Yet, on the other hand, we affirm that the truths "God is the author of the supernatural order" and "God rewards the supernaturally just" are necessary by absolute necessity—and these seem accessible from creatures.

Thus, for faith to truly be "revelation" in the narrow sense, a direct manifestation of God’s mind in revelation is required. St. Thomas explains that this can happen in two ways:

  1. Through a preacher sent by God.

  2. Through an extraordinary private revelation from God, minimally containing the revelation that God is the author of the supernatural order and the rewarder of the supernaturally just—implicitly including other articles/dogmas/doctrines, as mentioned above.

< One of these two means is evidently necessary, as we have denied that revelation in the broad sense (i.e., natural revelation alone) suffices for a salvific act of faith. >

St. Thomas further elaborates:

Granted that everyone is bound to believe something explicitly, no untenable conclusion follows even if someone is brought up in the forest or among wild beasts. For it pertains to divine providence to furnish everyone with what is necessary for salvation, provided that on his part there is no hindrance. Thus, if someone so brought up followed the direction of natural reason in seeking good and avoiding evil, we must most certainly hold that God would either reveal to him through internal inspiration what had to be believed or would send some preacher of the faith to him as he sent Peter to Cornelius (Acts 10:20). (QDeVer.Q14.A11.Rep1)

St. Alphonsus expands upon this:

What is this remote grace? St. Thomas explains it, saying that if anyone was brought up in the wilds, or even among brute beasts, and if he followed the law of natural reason, to desire what is good, and to avoid what is wicked, we should certainly believe either that God, by an internal inspiration, would reveal to him what he should believe, or would send someone to preach the Faith to him, as he sent Peter to Cornelius.
Thus, according to the Angelic Doctor, God, at least remotely, gives to infidels who have the use of reason sufficient grace to obtain salvation, and this grace consists in a certain instruction of the mind, and in a movement of the will, to observe the natural law. If the infidel cooperates with this movement, observing the precepts of the law of nature and abstaining from grievous sins, he will certainly receive, through the merits of Jesus Christ, the grace proximately sufficient to embrace the Faith and save his soul. (The History of Heresies)

ON THE TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS

If someone holds that the act of faith by its very nature terminates in an assent to the Incarnation and Trinity, then they agree with the "necessary by a necessity of means per se" position. If not, they either believe it to be a "necessity of means per accidens" or a "necessity of precept." This follows from the definition of the terms.

Now, St. Thomas clearly does not believe that the act of faith, by its very nature, terminates in an assent to the Incarnation and Trinity. This is evident from his distinction between necessity before and after the preaching of the gospel (which is seen in all the places where he discusses this). Thus, he could only believe that this necessity is a necessity of means per accidens or a necessity of precept.

What I find amusing about the claim of St. Thomas by those who hold Lorca's position is that they do not even attempt to demonstrate which type of necessity St. Thomas affirms—they simply repeat "he says it is necessary" without actually addressing the heart of the problem.

This is evident from several facts:

  1. St. Thomas bases the distinction of the states on an explicit presentation of the teaching by preaching rather than on intrinsic necessity: "we to whom such a great benefit has been shown must believe more explicitly than those who existed before the time of Christ" (Heb.C11.L2.n576.2). Thus, St. Thomas accounts for a gradual movement of greater and greater necessity as revelation becomes more and more explicit.

  2. St. Thomas believes that the belief that "God is and rewards those who are just" implicitly includes belief in Christ as mediator: "for the gentiles who were saved, it was enough if they believed that God is a rewarder; and this reward is received through Christ alone" (Ibid.). Now, if a gentile today were to have supernatural faith in such a thing under your supposition, they would both be justified by the act of faith and damnable by infidelity—which is absurd. St. Thomas clearly believes that if someone had implicit faith in Christ, then they would receive the effects of his redemptive work: "So also before Baptism Cornelius and others like him receive grace and virtues through their faith in Christ and their desire for Baptism, implicit or explicit: but afterwards when baptized, they receive a yet greater fullness of grace and virtues" (ST.III.Q69.A4.Rep2).

You could argue, on the basis of #2, that God simply would not reveal one without the other after the preaching of the gospel (which is not true due to the situation with Cornelius; cf., Sent.III.D25.Ex). However, this still aligns with the necessity per accidens position in all but name.

By the way, St. Thomas clearly thought that Cornelius was under the gospel and after the manifestation of Christ. The interpretation given by Billuart and others—that this age doesn't begin until 70 AD—is incorrect. This is evident from the fact that St. Thomas thought Cornelius had "habitual" (i.e., implicit) desire for baptism.

"The first fruits of the Spirit are given before baptism is actually received, but not before the habitual intention of receiving it, as was the case with Cornelius, or the actual intention, as is the case with others who have the faith of baptism" (Sent.IV.D3.Q1.A1.qa4.Rep1).

Thus, when St. Thomas refers to the gospel "not being made manifest" to Cornelius, he is clearly drawing our distinction.

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Kristian Keller
Kristian Keller
10月29日
編集済み
いいね!
Haz
Haz
11月01日
返信先

That's not a rebuttal. It's the ramblings of a fool. Wagner very meticulously studied the schoolmen on the subject and demonstrated that the classical position is that assent to the Trinity and Incarnation is not required by a per se necessitate medii. All you can do is state your opinion without substantiating it. This is because the Thomists are not with you.

いいね!
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