St. Thomas and Concupiscence in the Blessed Virgin Mary

NOTE: This is basically, as the last few articles have been, a quick article extracted from my notes. Thus, citations might not be quite exact and my writing style might, at times, be quite poor. Be aware. Ite ad Thomam!

cf., ST.III.Q27.A3, ST.III.Q27.A4.Obj1, ST.III.Q27.A5.Obj2, Sent.III.D3.Q1.A2.qa1, Sent.III.D3.Ex, CT.BookI.C224-225, Jerem.C1.L3

Introduction

As I have written about in many other places, I am firmly convinced that the teaching of St. Thomas, when genuinely understood in light of his commentators, does not contradict the teaching of the Church on the Immaculate Conception. Yet, there is another area of Mariology that seems almost impossible for a Thomist to defend, i.e., the teaching of St. Thomas on concupiscence and the Blessed Virgin.

Yet, I believe that on this topic as well St. Thomas is more precise than many give him credit for and provides a more profound treatment of this issue than many of his detractors do. Thus, St. Thomas provides us with a probable account on this controversial issue.

As a summary, we will see that, with an appeal to the controversies over the impeccability of the Blessed Virgin, that, in referring to the fomes peccati, St. Thomas simply meant to extrapolate the traditional position on the issue of the impeccability of the Blessed Virgin rather than to contradict what is Catholic Doctrine about the issue of concupiscence in the Blessed Virgin.

St. Thomas treated this question a number of times throughout his life, yet, his most mature account of this problem comes in his Compendium Theologiae, which acts as an interpretive key of his thought on this matter and shows the fruit of mature theological reflection and a quite precise reading of the Holy Fathers on the effects of the annunciation.

To summarize, we can state St. Thomas' teaching in a number of theses, coordinating proofs and explanations drawn from his writings.

Thesis 1. The Blessed Virgin was always free from motions of concupiscence against the order of reason.

In order to properly consider this question, we need to first understand what is meant by "concupiscence." For most, when they think of "concupiscence," they immediately think of those motions of the sense appetite that are against the order of reason, which are the effect and cause of sin. Yet, it is important, for this controversy, to completely remove such a notion from one's mind. Rather, we must precisely determine concupiscence as a "motion of the sense appetite," abstracting from its relation to the moral order. Thus, we can speak about "concupiscence" in Our Lord and Adam before the fall since, in both these cases, there were certainly motions of the sense appetites towards sense goods.

Now, when it comes to the relationship of these motions to reason, we can distinguish between three types of relation, the second two being called fomes peccati when treated as a habitual inclination, either unfettered or fettered, as we will cover below. First, these motions can be under reason, controlled either, a. Formally, or b. Virtually. According to St. Thomas, it is only in this relation that concupiscence stands to reason in Our Lord and our first parents before the fall, along with the Blessed Virgin AFTER the annunciation. Second, these motions can be beside reason. Thus, while they do not contradict and "fight against" reason, they also are not under the command of reason. According to St. Thomas, the Blessed Virgin, before the annunciation, also had these types of motions, yet did not have any after the annunciation. Third, these motions can be contrary to reason, inducing us to sin. It is in this relation that all those after the fall, excepting a special privilege from God, experience. The Blessed Virgin never had any of these motions.

This distinction between something being "beside" (praeter) as opposed to "against" (contra) is a distinction that is often brought forward in certain moral questions, e.g., moral questions surrounding NFP. Thus, for example, for a married couple to engage in this use during an infertile period is not "against" the end of procreation (else, it would certainly be sinful), rather, it is "beside" the end of procreation and thus can be truly said to be "in conformity" with the end, even if not positively willed.

This three-fold distinction as to motions of the appetites is most clearly made in the *Compendium Theologiae, where St. Thomas writes

Venial sin sometimes creeps up on us unawares, owing to the fact that an inordinate motion of concupiscence...arises prior to the advertence of the mind...Inordinate motions of this kind arise because the sensitive appetite...is not so obedient to reason as not sometimes to move toward an object outside the order of reason, or even, occasionally, against reason; and this is what engenders the sinful impulse. In the Blessed Virgin, accordingly, the sensitive appetite was rendered so subject to reason by the power of the grace which sanctified it that it was never aroused against reason, but was always in conformity with the order of reason. Nevertheless, she could experience some spontaneous movements not ordered by reason In our Lord Jesus Christ there was something more. In him the lower appetite was so perfectly subject to reason that it did not move in the direction of any object except in accord with the order of reason, that is, so far as reason regulated the lower appetite or permitted it to go into action of its own accord... In the Blessed Virgin Mary, however, the lower powers were not so completely subject to reason as never to experience any movement not preordained by reason. Yet they were so restrained by the power of grace that they were at no time aroused contrary to reason. Because of this we usually say that after the Blessed Virgin was sanctified concupiscence remained in her according to its substance, but that it was shackled. (CT.BookI.C224.7-9)

Yet, what are the reasons for accepting this freedom from concupiscence? St. Thomas' ordinary reason has to do with a certain probable argument. Traditionally, in the exegesis of Jer. 1:5 and Lk. 1:41, the conclusion that there was a certain sanctification in the womb of Ss. Jeremiah and John the Baptist is concluded. This sanctification confirmed them in sanctifying grace, thus freeing them from any mortal sins, yet allowing for certain venial sins. Now, as is obvious, the gifts given to the Mother of Christ must be greater than that given to Ss. Jeremiah and John the Baptist, thus there is not only a freedom from mortal sin, but also venial sins.

Now, how does God free one from mortal and venial sins? We will go into more detail later, but, logically, God frees from mortal and venial sins by freeing from the inclination towards mortal and venial sins. What is this inclination? Under one aspect, it is referred to as the fomes peccati (tinder of sin) if we are to consider as a habit, but, as an act, these are antecedent motions of the sense appetites that are contrary to reason. This is what pushes us towards sin.

First, in the Sentences Commentary, St. Thomas writes,

The sanctification of the Blessed Virgin was more excellent than the sanctification of others... For in the sanctification that happens through the common law in the sacraments, the fault is taken away, but the fomes that inclines one to mortal and venial sin remains. But in those who have been sanctified from the womb, the fomes inclining toward mortal sin does not remain, but the fomes’ inclination to venial sins remains; this is clear in the case of Jeremiah and John the Baptist, who did have actual sin that was not mortal, but venial. But in the Blessed Virgin the inclination of the _fomes_ was entirely removed, both as to venial sin and mortal sin. (Sent.III.D3.Q1.A2.qa1.RepSC4)

Second, in the Compendium Theologiae the same argument is made,

Her sanctification was more ample than that of others who were sanctified in the wombs of their mothers. Others thus sanctified in the womb were, it is true, cleansed from original sin; but the grace of being unable to sin later on, even venially, was not granted to them. The Blessed Virgin Mary, however, was sanctified with such a wealth of grace that thenceforth she was preserved free from all sin, and not only from mortal sin, but also from venial sin....[and, therefore, of] inordinate motion[s] of concupiscence. (CT.BookI.C224.7)

St. Thomas makes the reasoning clearer by forging the connection between such antecedent motions and a proximate danger of falling into venial sins,

Venial sin sometimes creeps up on us unawares, owing to the fact that an inordinate motion of concupiscence or of some other emotion arises prior to the advertence of the mind, yet in such a way that the first motions are called sins. Hence we conclude that the Blessed Virgin Mary never committed a venial sin, for she did not experience such inordinate motions of emotion. Inordinate motions of this kind arise because the sensitive appetite, which is the subject of these emotions, is not so obedient to reason as not sometimes to move toward an object outside the order of reason, or even, occasionally, against reason; and this is what engenders the sinful impulse. In the Blessed Virgin, accordingly, the sensitive appetite was rendered so subject to reason by the power of the grace which sanctified it that it was never aroused against reason, but was always in conformity with the order of reason. (Ibid.)

Thesis 2. Before the annunciation, the Blessed Virgin had motions of the sense appetite beside the order of reason, yet never contrary to the order of reason.

While we have excluded those motions of the sense appetite that are contrary to reason and dispose towards sin, can we go a step further and exclude also ALL antecedent motions of the sense appetites, whether contrary or beside reason? Are we forced by any necessary argument to place the Blessed Virgin in the same state of Our Lord and our first parents before the fall? St. Thomas argues that, not only are we not bound to take such a position, but, to the contrary, such a position is quite improbable, not only from the mass of authorities that can be gathered from the Fathers of the Church, but also from intrinsic arguments.

The argument that St. Thomas gives for this state which lasts between the Immaculate Conception and the Annunciation is Christological. He writes,

Although this appears to be part of the dignity of the Virgin Mother, yet it is somewhat derogatory to the dignity of Christ, without whose power no one had been freed from the first sentence of condemnation. And though, through faith in Christ, some were freed from that condemnation, according to the spirit, before Christ’s Incarnation, yet it does not seem fitting that any one should be freed from that condemnation, according to the flesh, except after His Incarnation, for it was then that immunity from condemnation was first to appear. Consequently, just as before the immortality of the flesh of Christ rising again, none obtained immortality of the flesh, so it seems unfitting to say that before Christ appeared in sinless flesh, His Virgin Mother’s or anyone else’s flesh should be without the fomes, which is called the law of the flesh or of the members (Rom 7:23, 25). (ST.III.Q27.A3.C.3)

Yet, there is a still more convincing argument which has to do with the use of reason in the Blessed Virgin. For, if we consider the matter at hand, freedom from antecedent motions of the sense appetites necessitates the actual use of reason. Yet, it is not altogether certain that the Blessed Virgin had the use of reason from the moment of her conception, as Our Lord had, due to the fact that, a. There is no certain revelation on this matter, and b. Our Lord's use of reason from conception followed from the unique privilege of the Beatific Vision. Thus, if we are to concede that the Blessed Virgin did not have the actual use of reason from the moment of her conception (or at least that it is not sufficiently probable), then we must likewise concede certain antecedent motions of the sense appetites (or at least that it is not sufficiently probable), which St. Thomas labels as fomes peccati, yet fettered.

Therefore it seems better to say that by the sanctification in the womb, the Virgin was not freed from the fomes in its essence, but that it remained fettered: not indeed by an act of her reason, as in holy men, since she had not the use of reason from the very first moment of her existence in her mother’s womb, for this was the singular privilege of Christ: but by reason of the abundant grace bestowed on her in her sanctification, and still more perfectly by Divine Providence preserving her sensitive soul, in a singular manner, from any inordinate movement. (ST.III.Q27.A3.C.4)

This last argument casts into doubt the overly triumphal declaration of many theologians that the Thomistic position on the fettering of the fomes peccati is completely excluded. How can it be the case that, in the words of Garrigou-Lagrange, "since the definition of the Immaculate Conception we are obliged to hold that...[there could be] no escape of her sensibility from the previous control of reason and will" when it is a speculative opinion that the Blessed Virgin even had the use of her reason from conception, a position completely unheard of before the 14th century and only common in the 16th century!

Thesis 3. After the annunciation, the Blessed Virgin only had motions of the sense appetite under the formal or virtual order of reason.

According to St. Thomas, following the Fathers of the Church and the testimony of Sacred Scripture, there is a certain special grace given in the conception of Christ to the Blessed Virgin where the Holy Spirit is said to "overshadow" her. This grace of the annunciation, according to St. Thomas, brought the Blessed Virgin to the greatest degree of sanctity in relation to motions of the sense appetite. In this state, not only were motions of the sense appetite "in the order of reason," rather, they were positively preordained by reason. The particular ways in which this was achieved and how it differed from the original grace will be treated in the fourth and fifth theses.

This will be the "most biblical" of the theses. Here, St. Thomas quotes an authority from scripture to back up his position, Ezek. 43:2. This is also gathered from the comparison between the Blessed Virgin and our first parents, who can't be thought of as in a greater position than the Blessed Virgin after the conception of Christ wherein the full effects of the Incarnation are brought to bear. Lastly, he gives a philosophical explanation of the relationship between the disposition of matter, the acquisition of form, and the completion of the end.

First, following what was cited above as a Christological explanation and quoting the verse from Ezekiel, he writes

Afterwards, however, at the conception of Christ’s flesh, in which for the first time immunity from sin was to be conspicuous, it is to be believed that entire freedom from the fomes redounded from the Child to the Mother. This indeed is signified (Ezek 43:2): Behold the glory of the God of Israel came in by the way of the east, i.e., by the Blessed Virgin, and the earth, i.e., her flesh, shone with His, i.e., Christ’s, majesty. (ST.III.Q27.A3.C.4)

Second, he explains it philosophically, as mentioned above

In natural things at first there is perfection of disposition, for instance when matter is perfectly disposed for the form. Second, there is the perfection of the form; and this is the more excellent, for the heat that proceeds from the form of fire is more perfect than that which disposed to the form of fire. Third, there is the perfection of the end: for instance when fire has its qualities in the most perfect degree, having mounted to its own place. In like manner there was a threefold perfection of grace in the Blessed Virgin. The first was a kind of disposition, by which she was made worthy to be the mother of Christ: and this was the perfection of her sanctification. The second perfection of grace in the Blessed Virgin was through the presence of the Son of God Incarnate in her womb. The third perfection of the end is that which she has in glory. (ST.III.Q27.A5.Rep2)

Thesis 4. The impeccability of the Blessed Virgin before the annunciation had a two-fold cause, partially intrinsic (insofar as the possibility of an inordinate motion of the sense appetite was removed, thus only permitting antecedent motions beside reason, not contrary) and partially extrinsic (insofar as Divine providence removed any occasion for sinful motions consequent to reason).

Here we enter into a distinct question (which will also be treated in the next thesis). Whereas the previous theses treated the Blessed Virgin relative to the motions of the sense appetites that she experienced, the fourth and fifth theses treat the causes that brought about this state.

Here, interestingly, as I will treat in an appendix, we see the orthodoxy of St. Thomas' position clearly shine through. For, whereas later theologians are hesitant to speak of the "fettering of the fomes" or any motions of concupiscence (for good reason, since such language can be so easily misunderstood), on the other hand, these same theologians will happily discuss questions of impeccability where positions similar to the ones put forward by St. Thomas are treated.

Now, since there is a two-fold state of the Blessed Virgin in relation to such motions, each state is going to have different causes of impeccability, and thus each require a different thesis. There are two types of motions of concupiscence that one can suffer in relation to the command of reason, i.e., antecedent and consequent. According to St. Thomas, the antecedent motions are, by a certain grace intrinsically placed in the Blessed Virgin, ordered in such a way as to not be against reason and thus not provide an occasion for sin on the part of the Blessed Virgin. On the other hand, there can be certain consequent motions of the sense appetite that also incline to sin, especially when we consider that the Blessed Virgin has certain motions that, while not against reason, are besides reason. This can also cause an inclination to sin. Thus, there is also, beside the intrinsic cause removing the occasion on the part of the Blessed Virgin, is also an extrinsic cause removing external occasions that may, when combined with the antecedent motions beside reason, provide an inclination to sin.

In order to explain this thesis in more detail, we must first see how St. Thomas defines the fomes peccati. He distinguishes between the fomes which are a "certain inordinate, but habitual, concupiscence of the sensitive appetite" and actual concupiscence which " is a sinful motion." Thus, the fomes and concupiscence are related as first and second act. In order to have a motion of concupiscence in its fullest and most proper way, St. Thomas teaches that "sensual concupiscence is said to be inordinate, in so far as it rebels against reason; and this it does by inclining to evil, or hindering from good." (ST.III.Q27.A3.C)

Thus, we hit a strange roadblock in terminology. As we saw above, St. Thomas clearly denies that there are motions of concupiscence that "rebels against reason" and thus there are not motions which "incline to evil or hinder from good." Therefore, we should conclude that there are not the fomes in the Blessed Virgin Mary from the principle that habitus cognoscantur per actus.

Yet, on the other hand, while there are not these proximate, immediate, and direct inclinations towards sin, we can still speak of certain motions that, while not inordinate, are beside reason, and therefore can be said to have a certain remote, mediate, and indirect inclination which presents the inclination in a purely negative and conditional manner when there are certain external objects presented.

So, St. Thomas prefers to speak of this situation as one where the fomes are "fettered," yet still present in essence. Unfortunately, this terminology is quite often misunderstood, even by theologians of the highest authority. Thus, for example, the Sacrae Theologiae Summa wrongfully censures the opinion of St. Thomas by interpreting the fettering of the fomes as meaning that the reason for the absence of sinful motions is something purely extrinsic, but, on the other hand, the extinction of the fomes as meaning that the reason for the absence of sinful motions is something purely intrinsic. Yet, this is a completely inadequate distinction for two reasons, first, as we shall see, the perfection of the sense appetite in the removal of motions against reason comes from an intrinsic perfection, i.e., sanctifying grace, and, second, this is a purely insufficient distinction between the three positions, rather, these are three different habitual states (unfettered, fettered, extinct) with three different motions (against reason, beside reason, preordained by reason) and, therefore, three degrees of intrinsic perfection, NOT a simple extrinsic difference that apparently guards the Blessed Virgin from her sense faculty that is disposed to inordinate acts from actually producing inordinate acts (which, as we have seen and will see, is completely against the doctrine of St. Thomas).

The fact of a perfecting influence of providence that comes aside to complete the impeccability of the Blessed Virgin due to the presence of motions beside reason seems like the obvious corollary to the peccability of Adam who, even while he had no motions that were not preordained by reason, still fell into sin due to a lack of extrinsic cooperation, and no more posits an actual and proximate inclination to sin in the Blessed Virgin than does the peccability of Adam posit a contradiction to the state of Original Justice.

St. Thomas expounds this teaching on the pre-annunciation impeccability in a number of different places.

First, he expounds it in ST.III.Q27.A4.Rep1. He begins by providing the intrinsic cause of such a state, i.e., the "fettering" of the fomes peccati, which removes the possibility of certain motions that are against reason,

After her sanctification in the womb the fomes remained in the Blessed Virgin, but fettered; lest she should be surprised by some sudden inordinate act, antecedent to the act of reason. (ST.III.Q27.A4.Rep1))

Yet, this is insufficient for the complete perfection of freedom from inclination to sin, so there is a second, exterior aspect, which St. Thomas expounds, saying,

And although the grace of her sanctification contributed to this effect, yet it did not suffice...we must therefore say that the above mentioned fettering (of the fomes) was perfected by divine providence not permitting any inordinate motion to result from the fomes. (ST.III.Q27.A4.Rep1)

The reason for this is that external circumstances may seize upon the opportunity presented by a motion beside reason and, when combined with such circumstances, be truly said to be an actual and proximate inclination to sin, which St. Thomas strenuously denies, rather than something which is simply habitual and remote.

This strenuous denial of an actual inclination is reflected in many places throughout the works of the Angelic Doctor, for example,

However, although the fomes remained in her in its essence after her first sanctification, still it remained bound and not inciting to sin. (Sent.III.D3.Ex.6)

This is also reflected in the refutation of a certain common objection drawn from the great profit that the saints have in the growth of virtue via the fomes peccati, where St. Thomas clearly argues that there is no inclination towards evil present in the Blessed Virgin (cf., Sent.III.D3.Q1.A2.qa1.Rep2).

Thus, the presence of the fomes peccati in the Blessed Virgin is compared to that of the impeding of knowledge in someone who is drunk,

The fomes remained in its essence after her first sanctification, but it was impeded by sanctifying grace from either inclining toward sin or withdrawing from the good. For it happens sometimes that a habit is hampered from being able to go into act, as knowledge can be by drunkenness. (Sent.III.D3.Q1.A2.qa1.C.10)

How far is this from the accusation of the Sacrae Theologiae Summa that St. Thomas affirms that "the sensitive appetite itself...is ready and proximately disposed to elicit acts opposed to right reason!"

Further, he writes,

One must also consider the tinder (fomitem), so to speak, which is the inclination to every evil, which indeed remains as an obstructed condition not inclining to that towards which it is ordered [i.e., sin]. While in some it would incline to the venial, albeit not to the mortal, yet in the blessed Virgin, her inclination was towards neither of these. (Jerem.C1.L3.n1.5.18)

Further, he writes,

In us the necessity of sinning at least venially arises from the inclination of the fomes. But in the Blessed Virgin this inclination was not present, with the fomes bound, as has been said. (Sent.III.D3.Q1.A2.qa1.RepSC5)

Throughout his writings, St. Thomas highlights, more often, the intrinsic cause of her impeccability more than the extrinsic cause, which is completely contrary to most moderns who wish to censure his opinion. He writes,

In the Blessed Virgin, accordingly, the sensitive appetite was rendered so subject to reason by the power of the grace which sanctified it that it was never aroused against reason, but was always in conformity with the order of reason. Nevertheless, she could experience some spontaneous movements not ordered by reason. (CT.BookI.C224.7)

Further, he writes,

In the Blessed Virgin Mary, however, the lower powers were not so completely subject to reason as never to experience any movement not preordained by reason. Yet they were so restrained by the power of grace that they were at no time aroused contrary to reason. Because of this we usually say that after the Blessed Virgin was sanctified concupiscence remained in her according to its substance, but that it was shackled. (CT.BookI.C224.9)

Thesis 5. The impeccability of the Blessed Virgin after the annunciation had a single cause which was completely intrinsic (insofar as there was also an exclusion of sense appetites beside reason wherein all motions were positively ordered by reason, whether formally or virtually and thus occasions did not need to be removed via providence).

The explanation of this thesis is already present in the above and, therefore, simple quoting of texts will suffice.

To begin, it might be helpful to look at the more extensive explanations of this state in Christ and Adam,

In our Lord Jesus Christ there was something more. In him the lower appetite was so perfectly subject to reason that it did not move in the direction of any object except in accord with the order of reason, that is, so far as reason regulated the lower appetite or permitted it to go into action of its own accord. So far as we can judge, a characteristic pertaining to the integrity of the original state was the complete subjection of the lower powers to reason. This subjection was destroyed by the sin of our first parent not only in himself, but in all the others who contract original sin from him. In all of these the rebellion or disobedience of the lower powers to reason, which is called concupiscence, or the fomes peccati, remains even after they have been cleansed from sin by the sacrament of grace. But such was by no means the case with Christ, according to the explanation given above. (CT.BookI.C224.8)

This same is granted by St. Thomas for the Blessed Virgin after the annunciation,

Now that the fomes was entirely taken away, might be understood in this way, that, by the abundance of grace bestowed on the Blessed Virgin, such a disposition of the soul’s powers was granted to her, that the lower powers were never moved without the command of her reason: just as we have stated to have been the case with Christ...as also was the case with Adam...by reason of original justice: so that, in this respect, the grace of sanctification in the Virgin had the force of original justice. (ST.III.Q27.A3.C.3)

On the Impeccability of the Blessed Virgin

As stated above, I believe that the question of the fettering of the fomes touches more the question of the impeccability of the Blessed Virgin than it does the presence of concupiscence. For, all know that the beginning of sin in man is found in an inordinate motion of the appetites wherein the appetites draw the will away from God and towards created goods. Thus, the questions of the freedom from concupiscence and the question of impeccability will be intimately bound up with one another, yet not identical. Above, we showed how St. Thomas firmly rejected that there was any sort of inordinate motion of concupiscence, one which would proximately, immediately, and positively dispose the Blessed Virgin to sin. Yet, he allows from a motion of concupiscence that is beside the order of reason, one which remotely, mediately, and negatively can be said, in an improper sense (since dispositions are positive), to "dispose" to sin. Yet, is it not the entire question of impeccability to ask the question of those remote, mediate, and negative dispositions to sin? Thus, while fighting against the Thomistic position on the fomes, they commit themselves to asking the same question and, in many cases, giving the same position (or, in some cases, a more lax position).

Thus, strangely enough, the very authors who censure St. Thomas for his opinion practically reproduce the same position when treating impeccability. Thus, the Sacrae Theologiae Summa,

Therefore the way in which Mary’s impeccability was put into act...came on the one hand from the extinction of the inclination of sin, and on the other hand from the special providence of God—both external by removing the occasions of sin, and internal by strengthening and confirming Her in good through her fullness of grace. (IIIA, pg. 384)

This position is quite confused, for, as St. Thomas pointed out in his day, what is the removal of the inclination of sin except the internal change mentioned, the "strengthening and confirming her in good through her fullness of grace?" In fact, this seems to reproduce the position of St. Thomas before the annunciation. For, after the annunciation, St. Thomas believed that the grace of the Blessed Virgin was so full that such external removals of occasions of sin was completely unnecessary.

How, in light of this, could St. Thomas ever be accused of having a "low" mariology? How can he be accused of anything more than a faithful reproducing of the patristic doctrine on the grace of the annunciation with careful attention to Sacred Scripture and a refusal to speculate about those matters "which are above us?"