The Key to Understanding 'Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus' and Vatican II
- Christian B. Wagner
- Apr 1
- 28 min read
Updated: Apr 14
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Introduction
This is not an article I am particularly desirous of writing. In fact, I would much prefer not to have to write on this topic, for few topics are more apt to breed misunderstanding and protests than discussions concerning the dogma of “Outside the Church there is no salvation.”
It is not for lack of zeal for the house of God that I write, but in a realistic understanding of the obstinacy that many show towards the traditional teaching. For many, they must delude themselves that this shows a “contradiction in Rome” so that they can deny the internal compulsion that they feel towards the Church that is so necessary for their salvation. Yet, there are many who are in good faith, seeking the truth without guile. It is to silence the first and enlighten the second that I write.
St. Hilary has written of this beforehand (giving a clear exposition of the concept of pertinacity),
It is manifest that there is nothing which men have ever said which is not liable to opposition. Where the will dissents the mind also dissents: under the bias of opposing judgment it joins battle, and denies the assertions to which it objects. Though every word we say be incontrovertible if gauged by the standard of truth, yet so long as men think or feel differently, the truth is always exposed to the cavils of opponents, because they attack, under the delusion of error or prejudice, the truth they misunderstand or dislike. For decisions once formed cling with excessive obstinacy: and the passion of controversy cannot be driven from the course it has taken, when the will is not subject to the reason. Enquiry after truth gives way to the search for proofs of what we wish to believe; desire is paramount over truth. Then the theories we concoct build themselves on names rather than things: the logic of truth gives place to the logic of prejudice: a logic which the will adjusts to defend its fancies, not one which stimulates the will through the understanding of truth by the reason. From these defects of partisan spirit arise all controversies between opposing theories. Then follows an obstinate battle between truth asserting itself, and prejudice defending itself: truth maintains its ground and prejudice resists. But if desire had not forestalled reason: if the understanding of the truth had moved us to desire what was true: instead of trying to set up our desires as doctrines, we should let our doctrines dictate our desires; there would be no contradiction of the truth, for every one would begin by desiring what was true, not by defending the truth of that which he desired. (De Trin., bk. 10)
Previously, I have discussed (in articles and videos) the topic of the necessity of the Church for salvation. Here, I want to discuss a slightly different topic, i.e., schism’s relationship to salvation. While many treat all of these as one topic, there are actually four distinct topics that must be addressed,
Each of these four topics requires careful and thorough treatment. Yet, unfortunately, many treat what needs the precision of a scalpel with the bluntness of a meat cleaver.
There were many other texts I could have quoted from the medievals beyond those cited here (pay attention to the placement I give from the Sentences Commentaries to do more research on your own), yet I do not wish to allow this topic to absorb more time than I have already conceded to it. For, I must follow the words of Pope St. Gregory the Great,
They that live without counsel, who give themselves over precipitately to the issue of events, are meanwhile harassed by no grief of reflection. For he that discreetly settles his mind in the counsels of life, heedfully takes account of himself, exercising circumspection in his every doing, and lest from that which he is doing a sudden and adverse issue should seize him, he first feels at it, gently applying to it the foot of reflection; he takes thought that fear may not withhold him from those things which ought to be done, nor precipitance hurry him into those which ought to be deferred; that evil things may not get the better of him through his desires by an open assault, nor good things work his downfall insidiously by vain glory. (Moralia, bk. 1, n. 35)
Ite ad Thomam.
THESIS I. Schism is to be taken in a moral rather than a juridical sense.
Explanation. There is a distinction between an act considered morally and an act considered juridically. In the moral order, we consider the internal forum and the conscience before God; in the juridical order, we consider the external forum and actions before men. Human judges (including ecclesiastical judges) do not deal directly—but only indirectly—with the internal forum. A prudent judge recognizes that he cannot know the internal forum with certainty, but only with a degree of probability. Therefore, he judges the act as it is externally manifested, excusing from the obligation of the law only when an impediment is manifest (e.g., mental retardation, legal minority, insanity, etc.) and the law explicitly provides for such exemption. When we speak of schism as damnable, we do not refer merely to the external, juridical act, but rather to the internal, moral reality.
This strikes at the root of anti-Catholic misreadings of the Fathers, medieval theologians, and prior Magisterial statements. For when they read Magisterial texts speaking about those who separate themselves from the Church or refuse submission to the Roman Pontiff, they assume these are to be understood in an external and juridical rather than an internal and moral sense. Yet if we examine the very medieval theologians who either influenced these statements by their writings or by their personal authority, we find that they did not understand schism in this external, juridical sense.
Proof 1. Baptism performed on an infant or adult outside the juridical bounds of the Church was regarded as efficacious. Therefore, etc.
The medieval theologians clearly and repeatedly affirmed that one can place an impediment to the fruitful reception of baptism (cf. ST III, q. 69, a. 9). They denied that those who actively adhered to schism or heresy could receive the graces of the sacraments. This is, of course, taught at the Council of Florence, which states:
“[U]nless they [schismatics] are joined to the Catholic Church before the end of their lives; [for] the unity of the ecclesiastical body is of such importance that only for those who abide in it do the Church's sacraments contribute to salvation…”
Most anti-Catholics interpret this passage as referring to the external bond of communion that juridically places one within the Church—that is, communion or schism in the external forum. Yet Catholic theologians have explicitly interpreted this teaching otherwise for the past 500 years, as even many anti-Catholics acknowledge, referring it instead to schism in the internal forum.
Is there evidence that this was also the teaching of the medievals? Yes—and this is seen most clearly in the case of the effect of baptism on the children of those in schismatic communions. In explaining this position (which he says “everyone agrees with”), St. Thomas states:
“Among children there cannot be a contrary will either actually or habitually; and thus in them neither willing nor intention is required for any impediment to be removed.” (Sent. IV, d. 6, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3, ad 2)
What is so important about this text (though he states the same in several places) is that it shows that impediments to the sacraments were understood as proceeding from the internal forum (i.e., the moral sphere), rather than the external forum (i.e., the juridical sphere).
Another illuminating text is where he connects this with the principle of Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus:
“This is to be understood, however, not as to receiving the sacrament, but as to the reality behind the sacrament (res sacramenti), which is the unity of the Church, outside of which there is no salvation, nor life.” (Sent. IV, d. 9, q. 1, a. 5, qa. 4, ad 2)
He states that the unity of the Church is bestowed by the sacrament. Thus, we even have here a connection to the third question I listed above, though this lies beyond the scope of the present article.
This is not only the teaching of St. Thomas, but of other medievals as well. I will cite only a select few—those who would have been most influential at the Council of Florence. Bl. John Duns Scotus, for example, comments on baptism administered by schismatics:
“The truth of the question is plain from many authorities, because by whatever malice a minister is bad (whether of heresy or schism or morals), with the unity of the Church preserved, if he intend to do what the Church does and keep the manner of the Church, he truly confers baptism; and such baptism truly has its effect in the baptized, notwithstanding the malice of the minister—unless the malice of the receiver stand in the way, in this, that he is receiving from such a minister…” (Lib. IV, d. 5, q. 1)
In order for baptism not to take effect, it is not sufficient that it be performed in a state of external disunity from the Church (i.e., schism in the juridical/external sense); rather, there must be some kind of malice on the part of the recipient.
St. Thomas and Bl. Scotus were (remotely) the most influential theologians at Florence. It is therefore appropriate to bring them forward as exemplifying the scholastic positions likely adopted by the authors and judges of the conciliar documents.
Yet I also believe this is the teaching of the Fathers of the Church. For example, Pope St. Stephen’s position (whose influence on this question is surpassed only by that of St. Augustine) was described by a contemporary, who stated:
“[Pope St.] Stephen and those who are of the same mind with him contend that in the baptism of heretics sins are forgiven; because it matters little who confers baptism, since grace is obtained through the invocation of the Blessed Trinity, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Nay, as the successor of Peter, upon whom the foundations of the Church have been laid, he says even that through the sacrament of baptism thus conferred all the stains of the old man are washed away, deadly sins are forgiven, the right of divine sonship is acquired, and a fit preparation is made for life eternal.” (Firmilian, Ep. 74)
This is likewise affirmed by St. Augustine in several places, often using the image of the woman begetting children for herself in the wombs of her handmaids (cf. Cardinal Franzelin, De Ecclesia Christi, thesis 23).
Proof 2. The possibility of invincible ignorance for those following an antipope was admitted. Therefore, etc.
Those who are in communion with an antipope are, juridically, severed from the Church, since juridical and external communion with the Pope exists only for those in communion with the true Pope. Yet, if we concede that a person may be in good faith regarding such a fact (a point which will be treated in detail below), this concession implies that the sin and the communion in question are moral and internal realities, rather than juridical and external ones. Such cases have indeed been admitted—especially in the context of the Great Western Schism.
As an example, Torquemada (arguably the most influential ecclesiologist at the Council of Florence) writes:
“Those who, after exact diligence to know the truth about who is the true pope, could not be fully clarified, and, induced by some probable reasons, adhere to an antipope—yet with the intention of always adhering to the true pontiff once they could be truthfully informed of this—seem to be excused from the stain and guilt of schism. This is proven because their ignorance is entirely involuntary, since it is invincible and without any disorder of the will; and consequently, the act that follows is without any fault. Hence, Lord Ulrich, in his Summa, says: ‘If someone, regarding a doubtful action, consults the more learned, having no express authority on whether it is so or not, provided he forms a good conscience after consulting the more learned, even if the matter turns out otherwise, he has not sinned. For he did what he could, and God requires nothing impossible from man…’” (Lib. IV, pt. 1, ch. XIV)
Proof 3. The possibility of invincible ignorance concerning the necessity of the Papacy as a doctrine was admitted. Therefore, etc.
This admission extended not only to ignorance of fact (i.e., who is the Pope), but also to ignorance of law (i.e., whether subjection to the Pope is necessary for salvation)—a distinction we will address further below. Such an extension applies particularly to the simplices—the “simple ones”—rather than to the learned, a distinction which will also be treated in due course.
Thus, Torquemada states:
“Simple people and the unlearned, who lack knowledge of law or fact, seem to be excused from the stain and guilt of schism by obeying and adhering to the one whom their prelates obeyed and adhered to, provided they have a readiness of mind to obey whoever’s right might be sufficiently shown—whether by God’s revelation, the Church’s declaration, or any other means.” (ibid.)
As with the second and third proofs, it is clear that this principle goes beyond mere lack of information about a claimant to the papacy, or even about the papacy itself. (How could someone make a moral decision regarding the true Pope if he were simply unaware of any such claims?) Rather, it concerns the binding force of conscience in the internal forum, particularly in the form of what later moralists refer to as moral hesitation—a concept we will examine more fully below.
Here again, the anti-Catholic argument is based on a grave misunderstanding of the distinction between the speculative and practical intellects.
Proof 4. Excommunicates were not regarded as necessarily cut off from the life of grace. Therefore, etc.
Excommunication was classically treated in commentaries on Sent. IV, dist. 18, where one can readily draw forth the consensus of the medieval theologians on this point.
Major excommunication is that which removes a person from the communion or society of the faithful and from participation in the sacraments (cf. Sent. IV, d. 18, q. 2, a. 1, q. 1; In Ep. I ad Cor., c. 5, l. 1, n. 237). Such individuals are not said to be “members of the Church,” and are, positively, described as “separated from the Church” (cf. In Ps. 26, n. 235). This separation is juridical and external and presupposes an internal act of mortal sin.
If the medieval theologians held what anti-Catholics now claim about them, it would follow that such a person is necessarily excluded from the possibility of salvation. Yet this is explicitly denied. While the excommunicated person is removed juridically and externally from the society of the faithful, he is not thereby removed spiritually or internally. When an excommunication is justly imposed, “it does have its effect”; but when it is unjust, the person does not “lose the grace of God” (Sent. IV, d. 18, q. 2, a. 1, q. 4).
Here the medievals explicitly distinguish between the forum of conscience and the forum of external judgment (cf. Sent. IV, d. 18, q. 2, a. 2, q. 1). In fact, it is precisely with reference to this very distinction that major excommunications are not pronounced against entire communities—which would otherwise follow logically from the anti-Catholic interpretation (cf. Sent. IV, d. 18, q. 2, a. 3, q. 2). This particular distinction will help with answering questions concerning particular judgements given by Roman Pontiffs that are cited against this reading of the Medievals.
This was actually something taught at the magisterial level in the Medieval era. Thus, Pope Innocent III writes,
"However, the judgment of the Church sometimes follows human opinion, which can often be mistaken, and for this reason, it happens at times that one who is bound before God is absolved by the Church, and one who is free before God is bound by the sentence of the Church.” (Appendix ad Regestorum Priores Libros, Titul. 31)
This was also clearly recognized in the Patristic era as well, such as, e.g., St. Augustine,
Often divine providence may permit that even good men may be expelled from the Christian congregation. If men will bear such a contumely or injury very patiently for the peace of the Church, nor will have created any novelties, schisms, or heresies, then they will teach men how truly God must be served by good will and by such genuine charity. The Father who sees in secret will crown men of this sort in secret. (De Vera Religione, ch. 6)
Further, this was formalized in the post-Reformation era, thus St. Robert Bellarmine
Such a person [unjustly excommunicated] is in the Church by his mind, or by desire, which suffices to salvation, but still not in the body or external communion which properly causes a man to be in this visible Church which is on earth. (De Ecclesia, bk. 3)
Proof 5. Internal acts are included in the definition of schism. Therefore, etc.
In their definition of schism, the medieval theologians include pertinacity or obstinacy as an essential component. Yet such an essential note goes beyond a merely external or juridical separation from the Church and necessarily requires a certain internal act.
Thus, St. Thomas states that schism is committed “wilfully and intentionally,” by disobedience “with rebellion,” and “pertinaciously” (ST II–II, q. 39, a. 1). Alexander of Hales—whom St. Thomas appears to follow—distinguishes between schism that is proper and most proper, the former not including pertinacity, and the latter explicitly including it.
This pertinacity is clearly defined by St. Isidore (whose definition is received by the medieval tradition) when he writes: “A person is said to be pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious” (Etym. X). It refers to an undue attachment to one’s own opinion. St. Thomas elaborates: pertinacity is that “by which a man is too much attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is better” (ST II–II, q. 132, a. 5; cf. De Malo, q. 9, a. 3; In I Cor., c. 11, l. 4, nn. 627.3–5). Thus, he states:
“These the Philosopher (Ethic. VII, 9) calls ischyrognomones, that is, headstrong, or idiognomones, that is, self-opinionated, because they abide by their opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought… The reason why a man is too persistent in his own opinion is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause.” (ST II–II, q. 138, a. 2)
The same principle is affirmed concerning heresy in ST I, q. 32, a. 4; Sent. I, d. 33, q. 1, a. 5; Sent. IV, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6; and In Gal., c. 1, l. 2, n. 28.3—all of which militate against the notion that heresy or schism can be reduced to merely juridical or external facts. This is most clearly set forth in De Malo, q. 8, a. 1, ad 7, where St. Thomas speaks of four grades: nescience, ignorance, error, and heresy. According to the opinions of the anti-Catholics, the common and necessary distinction between error and heresy could not be sustained.
This is something present even in the Patristic Era. Thus, St. Augustine states of certain Catholics with a heretical doctrine of God,
These carnal people, who think of God as having a human form, if they are content to be nourished with milk from the breast of the Catholic Church, and do not rush headlong into rash opinions, but cultivate in the Church the pious habit of inquiry, and there ask that they may receive, and knock that it may be opened to them, begin to understand spiritually the figures and parables of the Scriptures, and gradually to perceive that the divine energies are suitably set forth under the name, sometimes of ears, sometimes of eyes, sometimes of hands or feet, or even of wings and feathers a shield too, and sword, and helmet, and all the other innumerable things. And the more progress they make in this understanding, the more are they confirmed as Catholics. The Manichæans, on the other hand, when they abandon their material fancies, cease to be Manichæans. (Against the Fundamental Epistle of Manichaeus, n. 25)
St. Thomas offers a striking description of pertinacity in the context of intellectual stubbornness, where one adheres to error not by reasoning but by subjective attachment. He writes:
“He says that, if those who adopt the foregoing opinions do so not because of any reasoning, in the sense that they do not assume anything because they are obstinate, and do not inquire into the reasons for the things that they say, but stubbornly adhere to the opinions which they hold, it is not easy for them to give up an opinion of this kind. For every argument and every demonstration comes about in this way, namely, by admitting the truth of some statement and investigating the reason for it. But those who admit nothing destroy discussion and every rational argument, and thus no appeal of reason can be addressed to them whereby they can be dislodged from their error.” (In Metaph., bk. XI, l. 6, n. 2241.2)
Ironically, this description closely mirrors the disposition of many of the enemies of the Catholic Faith who attack it on this very point. Those who hear the Catholic Faith poorly presented—such that it does not provoke moral hesitation—are not said to be pertinacious, and thus cannot properly be called heretics or schismatics.
Confirmation 1. Abjuration was not practiced for those above the age of reason and below the age of majority.
The act of abjuration is a public act of repentance from adherence to heresy or schism. Traditionally, this was not required of anyone below the age of fourteen, even though such individuals were above the age of reason and may have adhered—either by birth or association—to a schismatic or heretical sect. From this, we may conclude that they were not considered culpable or morally liable for their adherence, even though they externally or juridically belonged to a state of schism or heresy. Further detail on this point can be found in the passage previously cited from Cardinal Franzelin.
Confirmation 2. The medievals venerated as saints many who died in a state of external or juridical schism.
This veneration includes numerous saints who died during the schisms of the first millennium, particularly those that occurred between East and West. Their inclusion in the cult of the saints—despite dying outside juridical communion with Rome—demonstrates that external separation from the Church was not considered, in itself, a sufficient sign of internal culpability or exclusion from sanctity.
THESIS II. The ordinary laws of culpability apply to the case of schism.
Explanation. As we have established in the first thesis, schism is to be taken in a moral rather than a juridical sense. Now, when it comes to moral acts, we consider in them certain laws of culpability. The most famous of these (and the only one that most people know of) is “invincible ignorance,” yet the ground covered by laws of culpability is much broader.
Often, what many of the anti-Catholic apologists will do is that they will get into discussions about the particular constituent of schism without realizing that moral acts (for the medievals and, I would argue, for the Fathers as well) are often described/stated with an assumption of culpability (since, ordinarily, individuals are culpable for their sins) without necessarily excluding the fact that there can be cases where someone can commit the act without sinning due to factors of inculpability.
Thus, when the medievals bring up the classic example of a man who sleeps with a woman who he thinks is his wife, the anti-Catholic apologists would shoot back by amassing quotations about the physical/mechanical constituent of intercourse and extensive banks of quotations about the gravity of adultery. We would obviously recognize the foolishness of the one example, yet how do we tolerate such foolishness from those wishing to attack the Catholic Faith? The second and third scholastics drank deeply of the first scholastics and understood intimately their synthesis, yet we tolerate the dishonor heaped on their heads by the moderns who presume (with little to no primary source understanding) to rashly judge them without humbly and carefully listening to them? If the anti-Catholic apologists are foolish, we are doubly foolish. Anyways, I digress.
It is also important to qualify what was said above when I wrote that “since, ordinarily, individuals are culpable for their sins.” This needs to be qualified since there are certain circumstances that can lead to widespread inculpability among certain groups. Two examples will illustrate this.
First, the case of the showing of cleavage (which, despite the dissimilitudes, gives us fruitful parallels). Traditionally, moralists (following St. Alphonsus) distinguished between two groups of women as to the showing of cleavage. First, those who attempted to introduce the custom. Second, those who simply followed an introduced custom.
The first group, generally, were regarded as mortally sinning for their action.
The second group, generally, were regarded as not mortally sinning for their action.
Yet, there is a caveat in the second group. Those who dress in such a way in an attempt to get men to lust after her mortally sin, yet those who simply follow the custom are not regarded as such.
This provides us a helpful illustration of how we can consider the culpability for the sin of schism on a social level. We can distinguish (following Ss. Optatus and Augustine) between schismatics and the sons of schismatics.
Those who introduce the schism among the people can generally be regarded as culpable for their actions. On the other hand, those who simply “grew up” in the schism are generally regarded as not culpable. Yet, as above, we must make a distinction. Those who, like the woman who shows cleavage in order to get men to lust, are malicious in their schism can be guilty for it. We will see this explained more precisely below by St. Alphonsus and Billuart.
Yet, I must emphasize, before I am misunderstood, that these were general rules and gave way to particular exceptions since culpability is something present among individuals, not among groups. Thus, you can have someone who introduces a schism and is not culpable (e.g., a mentally retarded man who introduces and propagates a schism).
The second example we can bring forward is the case of self-abuse (masturbation). Moralists treated this case delicately, pointing out the fact that such a sin is often introduced among the young without their perception of malice in the act. This is exactly what is implied in the abjuration of heresy stated above.
First Instance. Ignorance was already treated in the second and third proofs of the first thesis. Yet, it is fitting to give a fuller treatment here according to the mind of the medievals (who ordinarily treat this question in their commentaries on II Sent., d. 22).
Generally speaking, the concern is whether and how ignorance may or may not cause the act to be involuntary. Thus, St. Thomas states:
And so, having made these observations, it should be known that ignorance only excuses or lessens sin to the extent that it causes involuntariness. For that of which one is ignorant cannot be voluntary. Now, ignorance that is not the cause of an act does not cause involuntariness, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3. Hence it in no way excuses or diminishes sin. Rather, only that kind that is the cause of an act does. Now, this can excuse sin either completely or partly. For if there is such ignorance to which no notion of fault is in any way connected, then the very fact of ignorance excuses completely, as in the case of invincible ignorance and ignorance of the particular [i.e., ignorance of fact], provided due diligence was employed. (Sent. II, d. 22, q. 2, a. 2, c.; cf. De Ver., q. 17, a. 4, ad 5)
On the part of the knower, one becomes culpable when it is in some way voluntary, i.e., either, in the words of Torquemada, “when someone directly wishes to remain ignorant of the knowledge of truth and is drawn back by sin,” or when one does “not care to apply diligence but neglect[s] to be informed of the truth, which [he is] bound to investigate.”
This is supported by St. Thomas, who states:
Ignorance can be in someone's power in two ways. For it is either in his power in itself, as when someone is ignorant of a precept that he could know at once; or it is in his power with regard to its cause, though not in itself, as is clear in the ignorance of someone who is [willfully] drunk [and foresees the malice, cf. ST II–II, q. 150, a. 4], since the drunkenness that is the cause of the ignorance was in his power. (ibid.)
Thus, on the part of the knower, where this is absent, he is not culpable for his ignorance. We can further distinguish (as I stated above following Torquemada) between “ignorance of law” and “ignorance of fact” on the part of the object:
One kind of ignorance is of that which one is bound to know, and, according to the Philosopher, this is called "ignorance of the universal," and, according to legal experts, "ignorance of law." This is varied in different people, as has been said. For one person is bound to know certain things that another is not bound to know. On the other hand, there is ignorance of that which one is not bound to know, and this is knowledge of actual particular circumstances, which the Philosopher calls "ignorance of the particular," while the jurists call it "ignorance of fact." (ibid.)
This is actually the basis for the distinction between the minores and maiores explicated above by Torquemada. Those who are “simple” are only bound to know those articles of the faith necessary for their salvation (i.e., the Articles of the Creed), whereas those who are learned (those with the officium magisterii, Sent. II, d. 22, exp. 5) are bound to know many other things depending on their state in life. This is generally treated by the medievals in their commentaries on III Sent., d. 25. Thus, St. Thomas writes:
To the third question, it should be said that the articles of the faith become explicit in two ways. In one way, with regard to the substance of the articles themselves, insofar as one knows the articles themselves distinctly. In another way, with regard to things that are implicitly contained in the articles, which happens when a man knows the things that follow upon the articles, and the power of the truth of the articles themselves, through which they can be defended from every attack. As regards the first explication, all are wholly bound who have the office of teaching the faith, whether due to their grade of dignity, such as priests, or due to revelation, such as prophets, or due to their ministry, such as teachers and preachers. But this is not so with others, on whom does not lie the office of teaching the faith, because it suffices for them, as they have only to rule themselves, to know those articles through which they can direct their own proper intention to the ultimate end… anyone on whom lies the office of instructing others about the faith—those who are being called “the great” (maiores)—are bound to know as much of this explication as pertains to his office. But lesser ones (minores), on whom the office of teaching does not lie, are not bound to this explication. (Sent. III, d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 3)
This is vital to understand, so we are able to understand what is being argued by Torquemada above. It is not a mere downloading of more info-points that makes one of the maiores; rather, it is a certain office. As St. Thomas writes: “Those who know more are not called ‘great,’ but rather those on whom lies the office of teaching the faith.” (ibid., ad 3)
Thus, in order for one of the minores to be culpable for their sin, it requires that “they stubbornly (pertinaciter) defend the things that are contrary to the articles.” (ibid., ad 2)
Thus, we see that there are two distinct situations where this type of ignorance excuses. The first is properly labeled as ignorance, and the second more properly a species of nescience: “If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance excuses from sin altogether.” (ST I–II, q. 76, a. 3)
First, there are those whose office it is to teach theology. These are held to a higher standard, and for these, their ignorance of the law cannot be excused under this aspect (although it could under further aspects, as we will cover). Rather, they are only excused as to ignorance of fact (e.g., they make a false judgment about the true Pope).
Second, there are those who are average laymen. These individuals are bound to know the articles of the faith necessary for their salvation; as to other things, they are not held culpable for their lack of knowledge. Rather, it is only when they perceive how a certain doctrine is contained in those articles they profess and reject it anyway (i.e., pertinaciously defend) that they can be said to be heretics for their acts. This brings us to a general statement made by St. Augustine about heretics:
Though the doctrine which men hold be false and perverse, if they do not maintain it with passionate obstinacy, especially when they have not devised it by the rashness of their own presumption, but have accepted it from parents who had been misguided and had fallen into error, and if they are with anxiety seeking the truth, and are prepared to be set right when they have found it, such men are not to be counted heretics. (Ep. 43)
Second Instance. Although this is not truly a second instance, but really a species of ignorance (since vincible ignorance includes the induction of a certain perception of obligation, as we saw in the first instance), certain biases or prejudices can make one inculpable for their ignorance.
Generally, this is why St. Thomas states that “When sin is committed through ignorance, that which is a sin is not totally unknown, but it is unknown in a certain respect, since one does not know of the act that it is evil.” (Sent. II, d. 41, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3) That whereby we come to know that an act is evil is the impression of conscience (which is covered at length in any tract on conscience): “a human act is judged virtuous or vicious according to the apprehended good, to which the will is borne through itself, and not according to the material object of the act” (Q. III, q. 12, a. 2), which is how we distinguish between an act formally taken and an act materially taken: “If, therefore, something which, according to itself is not against the law of God, such as to lift straw from the earth… and thus the will is borne to it, it is clear that the will is borne, speaking of itself and formally, to that which is against the law of God, while materially it is borne to that which is not against the law of God.” (ibid.)
Thus, St. Alphonsus states (in the case of Protestants):
When those raised in heresy have been persuaded from childhood that... [Catholics] reject and persecute the Word of God, that we are idolaters, pestilent, and deceivers, and therefore to be avoided as a plague, they cannot, while this persuasion remains, listen to us with a safe conscience, and they labor under invincible ignorance, since they do not doubt that they are on the right path. (Theologia moralis, bk. 2, ch. 2, no. 9)
Further, Charles René Billuart states:
Indeed, neither would he sin if his ignorance were involuntary and blameless, as happens among uneducated Catholics, or those who are neglected by their parents and pastors, and even among those raised among heretics, who have never heard anything of the Catholic faith, or only heard mockeries and blasphemies against it, and are not troubled by any doubt in this matter. Thus, if they hold other articles to be believed as necessary means and are mentally prepared to believe the rest if it were duly presented to them, they do not seem to be outside the path of salvation. Nor is it opposed that there is no salvation outside the Church: for by reason of baptism, the faith they possess, and their internal disposition to believe the rest, they can be said to be within the Church. (Summa Sancti Thomae, diss. 5, art. 3, no. 1)
THESIS III. The above teaching is contained in the teaching of the Second Vatican Council
From the consideration of all of the above, we can clearly see that this is the teaching of the Second Vatican Council, from two important texts that temper and clarify their approach to those who are juridically or externally separated from the Church.
First, the exclusion of sacramental grace from those without the proper dispositions of the sacraments: “Whenever the Sacrament of Baptism is duly administered as Our Lord instituted it, and is received with the right dispositions, a person is truly incorporated into the crucified and glorified Christ…” (UR 22)
Thus, any statements about the working of the sacraments outside of juridical communion with the Church are going to be tempered by this statement of proper dispositions. Those who pertinaciously adhere to their schism or heresies are not going to receive sacramental graces.
How is this anything different than what was explicitly and extensively stated by the medievals? We say that the effect of grace takes place without these impediments, and does not with them. Do we not see every medieval witnessing to this fact in its proper locus?
Second, “whosoever, therefore, knowing that the Catholic Church was made necessary by Christ, would refuse to enter or to remain in it, could not be saved.” (LG 14)
Is this not simply a strict explanation of the Florentine dogma? How is it any different? Unless we suppose a juridical reading of Florence (which I have shown to be impossible), is this not stating the exact same thing?
How do we not, with these two texts, beautifully and succinctly state the limits set forward by the tradition on the effects of sacraments outside the Church and the nature of schism?
Excursus: Historic judgments of the Church on different groups
One objection that has recently gained popularity among some has to do with the historic judgment that the Church has given against certain schismatic groups. They reason that it is impossible (although some limit this to the sphere of probability) that “Vatican II” (which is not really “Vatican II,” but the teaching of tradition) can be correct, given the judgment on certain groups (e.g., Hussites) that they are clearly without sacramental grace. A few notes on this:
First, this argument cannot strike anyone with a basic knowledge as being anything but fallacious. Early in one’s studies of logic, they learn that two particulars are not contrary to one another. Thus, it is fallacious, e.g., to claim that “some Americans are fat” is contrary to “some Americans are thin.” Thus also, I can simply concede (in argumentum) that the reading of the history is correct and state that “some schismatics lack grace” is not contrary to “some schismatics have the fruits of grace.”
You may say, but it is not contrary to the laws of logic to point to a contradiction between a universal and a particular judgment. Now, the judgment of Florence that “all schismatics lack grace” and the judgment of Vatican II that “some schismatics have the fruits of grace.”
The major is conceded. The minor has already been refuted. For Florence speaks of “schismatics” in a moral sense, whereas Vatican II speaks of it simply in a juridical sense. Thus, the reasoning is fallacious as an equivocation.
Further, you may say, assuming the same major premise, and argue thus: Vatican II teaches that “all schismatics have the fruits of grace,” whereas the previous magisterium taught that certain schismatic groups did not have the fruits of grace (e.g., the Hussites).
The minor premise here is denied on two grounds. First, as seen in the third thesis, Vatican II did not give this universal premise but only stated it of certain contemporary groups. Thus, we can look back to the analogy given in the second thesis between a society where certain practices of dress have been introduced, whereas others have not. Second, it is denied that the anti-Hussite bulls completely and unequivocally denied any fruits of grace, but only generally. It is on this basis that the medievals allowed for minor excommunications of schismatic groups but did not allow for the major excommunication of schismatic groups, as stated above.
Further, you may say, but this is simply a probable argument and not demonstrative.
For a probable argument to be sound, there must be some sort of proportion between the analogates. Yet such is not the case for the Hussites and 20th-century schismatic groups. In the case of the Hussites, pertinacity was much more generally established insofar as preachers had been sent among the heretical group, thus meriting a general punishment and removing the likelihood (though not possibility) of those who were inculpable. On the other hand, as was pointed out in the second thesis in the words of St. Alphonsus and Billuart (and many others), after the time of the Reformation, many of these groups were infected with such prejudices which rendered most of them inculpable.
Second, as is clear and evident from any treatment of the judicial penalties that the Church inflicts (e.g., what was said above about excommunications), the judge in such matters frequently errs, whether through deception, lack of knowledge, or personal defect.
Further, his competence does not extend beyond a mere probable judgment due to the fact that he simply judges certain signs of pertinacity rather than being able to certainly determine the presence of pertinacity (as, e.g., listed out by Torquemada). The certitude is simply moral, rather than physical.
Thus, even if I were to concede the facts of history in argumentum and even concede that such a judgment was wrong, such a conclusion STILL does not follow.
You may say, this contradicts the safety of judicial pronouncements of the Roman Pontiff.
In such matters, the safety is not objective, but subjective, in the same way that adherence to one’s confessor in moral doubts does not somehow render his judgments morally flawless, but does free me from guilt in the matter. St. Alphonsus treats such issues at length in his tract on conscience. Further, St. Thomas makes comments on this safety here and there throughout his comments on excommunication (which is why he counsels a complete obedience even in unjust excommunications).
You may say, but this judgment was habitual.
In order for a judgment to be habitual, it must enter into the genuine sense of the Roman Pontiff in a number of different teachings, throughout a number of different cases, and in a number of different times, along with entering into the proper matter of such habitual adherence. It is flatly absurd to call such judicial pronouncements “habitual” on this basis.
You may say, you would be bound by contrary judgments.
Even if I were to concede such, this still would not be the case. Both acts are non-definitive acts. Obsequium and conditional assent would be offered to the constitution as more solemnly promulgated and of higher weight.